



10th Grade Treaty of Versailles Inquiry

Can Peace Lead to War?



Edward N. Jackson, photograph of Allied leaders British prime minister David Lloyd George, Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, French premier Georges Clemenceau, and United States president Woodrow Wilson. Public domain. US Signal Corps photo. Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Big_four.jpg.

Supporting Questions

1. What did President Woodrow Wilson mean by “peace without victory”?
2. What did Germany lose by signing the Treaty of Versailles?
3. Why was Germany blamed for World War I?
4. Did the German reparation payments stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles set the stage for World War II?



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Can Peace Lead to War?	
New York State Social Studies Framework Key Idea & Practices	10.5 UNRESOLVED GLOBAL CONFLICT (1914–1945): World War I and World War II led to geopolitical changes, human and environmental devastation, and attempts to bring stability and peace. ☑ Gathering, Using, and Interpreting Evidence ☑ Comparison and Contextualization ☑ Chronological Reasoning and Causation
Staging the Question	Read the <i>Christian Science Monitor</i> article “Germany Finishes Paying WWI Reparations, Ending Century of ‘Guilt’” and discuss why some historians claim World War I did not end until 2010.

Supporting Question 1	Supporting Question 2	Supporting Question 3	Supporting Question 4
What did President Woodrow Wilson mean by “peace without victory”?	What did Germany lose by signing the Treaty of Versailles?	Why was Germany blamed for World War I?	Did the German reparation payments stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles set the stage for World War II?
Formative Performance Task	Formative Performance Task	Formative Performance Task	Formative Performance Task
Write a definition for the term “peace without victory” and explain why President Wilson saw this as a necessary component of the Treaty of Versailles.	List Germany’s losses of territory and armed forces, and write one or two sentences explaining why these losses would have upset most Germans.	Write a paragraph explaining how the Treaty of Versailles blamed Germany for World War I and how most Germans reacted to the treaty.	Develop a claim supported by evidence that answers the supporting question.
Featured Sources	Featured Sources	Featured Sources	Featured Sources
Source A: Excerpts from “Peace without Victory” Source B: Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Source C: <i>Woodrow Wilson—The Fourteen Points</i> Source D: Photograph: “The Big Four”	Source A: Excerpts from the Treaty of Versailles Source B: Map of German territorial losses	Source A: War Guilt Clause (Article 231), Treaty of Versailles Source B: Excerpts from von Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter to Clemenceau, president of the Paris Peace Conference	Source A: Excerpts from the Treaty of Versailles Source B: Excerpts from <i>The Economic Consequences of the Peace</i> Source C: Excerpts from “Ending the War to End All Wars”

Summative Performance Task	ARGUMENT Did peace lead to war? Construct an argument (e.g., detailed outline, poster, or essay) that addresses the compelling question using specific claims and relevant evidence from historical sources while acknowledging competing views.
	EXTENSION Participate in a class debate on whether or not the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh on Germany or whether the treaty failed to go far enough to protect peace in Europe.
Taking Informed Action	UNDERSTAND Research Germany’s current economic status. ASSESS Weigh the extent to which Germany could and/or should help other countries in the Eurozone that are in need of economic stimulus (e.g., Italy and Greece). ACT Create a class wiki page that outlines students’ research on Germany’s current economy and proposes ideas for steps Germany should take or not take to help other parts of the Eurozone.



Overview

Inquiry Description

The compelling question “Can peace lead to war?” offers students an opportunity to explore the historic controversy surrounding the extent to which the Treaty of Versailles caused World War II. Students consider not only the stipulations of the peace treaty but also the nature of historical interpretation by following the voices of historians throughout the inquiry. While progressing through the inquiry, students consider the original vision of the Treaty of Versailles, the conditions of the treaty itself, and the reactions to the treaty both at the time and by modern-day historians.

In addition to the Key Idea listed earlier, this inquiry highlights the following Conceptual Understanding:

- (10.5c) The devastation of the world wars and use of total war led people to explore ways to prevent future world wars.

NOTE: This inquiry is expected to take four to six 40-minute class periods. The inquiry time frame could expand if teachers think their students need additional instructional experiences (i.e., supporting questions, formative performance tasks, and featured sources). Teachers are encouraged to adapt the inquiries in order to meet the needs and interests of their particular students. Resources can also be modified as necessary to meet individualized education programs (IEPs) or Section 504 Plans for students with disabilities.

Structure of the Inquiry

In addressing the compelling question “Can peace lead to war?” students work through a series of supporting questions, formative performance tasks, and featured sources in order to construct an argument with evidence from a variety of sources while acknowledging competing perspectives.

Staging the Compelling Question

Teachers could stage the compelling question by having students read an article from the *Christian Science Monitor*, “Germany Finishes Paying World War I Reparations, Ending Century of ‘Guilt.’” Students should discuss why some historians claim that World War I did not end until 2010. As students read and discuss the article, they are previewing conditions of the Treaty of Versailles (e.g., reparations and guilt) and one historic interpretation of the event and its consequences that will be useful as the inquiry develops.



Supporting Question 1

The first supporting question—“What did President Woodrow Wilson mean by ‘peace without victory’?”—calls on students to consider what Wilson intended the Treaty of Versailles to accomplish. Students should think about the conditions Wilson established and his reasons for these specific guidelines. The formative performance task calls on students to write a definition for the phrase “peace without victory” and explain why Wilson saw this as a necessary component for the Treaty of Versailles. The first two featured sources are excerpts from Wilson’s speech “Peace without Victory” and from his Fourteen Points. The third featured source is an explanation of the Fourteen Points by the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs while the fourth is a photograph of Allied leaders—British prime minister David Lloyd George, Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, French premier Georges Clemenceau, and US president Woodrow Wilson.

Supporting Question 2

The second supporting question—“What did Germany lose by signing the Treaty of Versailles?”—asks students to consider the larger material losses that faced Germany as they signed the treaty. The formative performance task calls on students to list Germany’s losses of territory and armed forces and to write one or two sentences explaining why these losses upset most Germans. The first featured source for this task includes excerpts from the Treaty of Versailles outlining these conditions and losses. The second featured source is a map highlighting the territorial losses and the armed forces regulations.

Supporting Question 3

The third supporting question—“Why was Germany blamed for World War I?”—calls on students to investigate the assignment of guilt for World War I and how Germany reacted to these conditions. The formative performance task asks students to write a paragraph explaining how the Treaty of Versailles blamed Germany for World War I and how most Germans reacted to this judgment. The two featured sources for this task are the “War Guilt Clause” (Article 231) from the Treaty of Versailles and an excerpt from a letter from the leader of the German peace delegation, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, to Paris Peace Conference president Georges Clemenceau, which explains Germany’s reaction to the Treaty of Versailles.

Supporting Question 4

The final supporting question—“Did the German reparation payments stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles set the stage for World War II?”—calls on students to focus on the issue of reparations and the extent to which they set the stage for World War II. The formative performance task asks students to develop a claim using evidence in response to the supporting question. The first two featured sources are selected articles from the Treaty of

Versailles relating to reparations and an excerpt from John Maynard Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, which alludes to the future unrest in Europe. The final source is an excerpt from a *New York Times* article that questions the historical accuracy of the damage caused by the reparations.

Summative Performance Task

At this point in the inquiry, students have examined the original goals for the Treaty of Versailles, the conditions set by the treaty, Germany's reaction to it, and a range of viewpoints from historians on its impact. Students should be able to demonstrate the breadth of their understandings and abilities to use evidence from multiple sources to support their claims. In this task, students construct an evidence-based argument responding to the compelling question "Can peace lead to war?" It is important to note that students' arguments could take a variety of forms, including a detailed outline, poster, or essay.

Students' arguments likely will vary, but could include any of the following:

- The Treaty of Versailles paved the way for World War II because it caused Germany to pay huge sums of money and to accept the blame for World War I, therefore fueling feelings of anger and resentment.
- Although the Treaty of Versailles created anger among Germans forced to accept blame for World War I, the Treaty also attempted to establish peace in Europe by limiting Germany's armed forces.
- The Treaty of Versailles did not lead to war because the estimated damages and effects have been overstated and were only partially responsible for the instability in Germany before World War II.

Students could extend these arguments by participating in a debate to determine whether or not the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh against Germany or if it did not go far enough to restore peace in Europe.

Students have the opportunity to Take Informed Action by drawing on their knowledge about peace between nations. They demonstrate their *understanding* by researching the current period of economic growth and stability experienced by Germany. Teachers might use any number of articles to help prompt students' research, but could begin with Jack Ewing's article "German Economy Expanded 1.5% in 2014," from the January 15, 2015, *New York Times* (<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/business/international/germany-economy-growth-2014.html>). Students show their ability to *assess* by evaluating the extent to which Germany could or should help the struggling Eurozone. And they *act* by creating a class wiki page detailing their research and their suggestions for Germany's next steps. For teachers wanting guidance with building wiki pages, a great starting resource is "Wikis," which is found at Vanderbilt University's Center for Teaching website (<http://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/wikis/>).



Staging the Compelling Question

Featured Source

Source A: Isabella de Pommereau, article describing the effects of reparation payments, “Germany Finishes Paying WWI Reparations, Ending Century of ‘Guilt’,” *Christian Science Monitor*, October 4, 2010

NOTE: Teachers and students can read this article by clicking on the following link:

<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/1004/Germany-finishes-paying-WWI-reparations-ending-century-of-guilt>



Supporting Question 1

Featured Source

Source A: Woodrow Wilson, speech to the United States Senate describing his approach to ending World War I, “Peace without Victory” (excerpts), January 22, 1917

Gentlemen of the Senate,

On the 18th of December last I addressed an identic note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted....

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late....

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point; the statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of



mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power....

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own....

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

Public domain. The full speech is available on the PBS website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/wilson/filmmore/fm_victory.html.



Supporting Question 1

Featured Source

Source B: Woodrow Wilson, speech to the United States Congress outlining his goals for ending World War I, "The Fourteen Points," 1918

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow nor or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the

government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Public domain. Available at the website of the Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale University:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.



Supporting Question 1

Featured Source

Source C: The Miller Center at the University of Virginia, description of Wilson's vision for ending World War I, "Woodrow Wilson—The Fourteen Points," 2015

Woodrow Wilson—The Fourteen Points

On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson gave a speech to Congress in which he presented his Fourteen Points that outlined his program of peace to end World War I. The first five points called for an end to secret treaties, freedom of the seas, free trade, reduction of arms, and adjustment of colonial claims, taking into account the wishes of the colonial population. Wilson's sixth point called for Germany to withdraw from Russian territory and for Russian self-determination of its own government. The President then called for the restoration of Belgian, Italian, and French borders, the establishment of a Polish state, and autonomy for the ethnic peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Wilson's final and, in his mind, most important point was the establishment of a "general association of nations" that would foster international cooperation, freedom, and peace.

Wilson had drafted the Fourteen Points as a series of war aims he hoped would reinvigorate the Allied cause after Russia withdrew from the war following the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The war aims were based on the principle of "peace without victory" that Wilson had proposed in 1916 as a solution to the European stalemate. Along with his adviser, Colonel Edward House, Wilson had come up with his Fourteen Points after more than a year of discussions with other progressive thinkers, especially journalist Walter Lippmann, on what the United States should hope to accomplish through its intervention in the war.

Wilson intended his speech to rally support in the Allied governments to the idea of a league of nations and a more transparent international system. He hoped these war aims would entice the Russian people back into the war by giving them something worthy for which to fight. Wilson also hoped the democratic ideas of the proposal, especially self-determination, would breed unrest in Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The Fourteen Points speech, as the New York *Herald* dubbed it, became the basis for Allied armistice plans. As Germany neared military defeat in the fall of 1918, the German government approached Wilson first in response to his Fourteen Points plan. The plan's territorial provisions and call for the establishment of a league of nations became the basis for a portion of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the war in 1919. However, Wilson was unable to convince Britain, France, and Italy to pursue "peace without victory," and he was forced to compromise on many points.

Still, as a work of international relations policy, Wilson's Fourteen Points represent one of the most remarkable efforts of an American President. Wilson's embrace of anti-imperialism and national self-determination made a lasting impact in international relations through the rest of the 20th century.


"Woodrow Wilson: Key Events: The Fourteen Points." on American President, Miller Center at the University of Virginia, <http://millercenter.org/president/wilson/key-events>.



Supporting Question 1

Featured Source

Source D: Edward N. Jackson, photograph of the World War I Allied leaders, “The Big Four,” 1919



The Big Four Allied leaders photographed May 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference. From left: British prime minister David Lloyd George, Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, French premier Georges Clemenceau, and US president Woodrow Wilson.

Public domain. Photo by Edward N. Jackson (US Army Signal Corps). US Signal Corps photo. Available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Big_four.jpg.



Supporting Question 2

Featured Source

Source A: Allied and Central Powers, selected articles from the treaty ending World War I, Treaty of Versailles (excerpts), June 28, 1919

Article 33

Germany renounces in favour of Belgium all rights and title over the territory of Prussian Moresnet situated on the west of the road from Liege to Aix-la-Chapelle; the road will belong to Belgium where it bounds this territory.

Article 34

Germany renounces in favour of Belgium all rights and title over the territory comprising the whole of the Kreise of Eupen and of Malmedy. During the six months after the coming into force of this Treaty, registers will be opened by the Belgian authority at Eupen and Malmedy in which the inhabitants of the above territory will be entitled to record in writing a desire to see the whole or part of it remain under German sovereignty. The results of this public expression of opinion will be communicated by the Belgian Government to the League of Nations, and Belgium undertakes to accept the decision of the League.

Article 42

Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine.

Article 43

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44

In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

Article 45

As compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war, Germany cedes to France in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and charges of any kind, the coal-mines situated in the Saar Basin as defined in Article 48.

Article 159

The German military forces shall be demobilised and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.

Article 160

(1) By a date which must not be later than March 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.

After that date the total number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.

The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed four thousand.

(2) Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs shall be organised in accordance with Table No. 1 annexed to this Section.

The number and strengths of the units of infantry, artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in the aforesaid Table constitute maxima which must not be exceeded.

The following units may each have their own depot:

An Infantry regiment; A Cavalry regiment; A regiment of Field Artillery; A battalion of Pioneers.

(3) The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army corps headquarters staffs.

The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden.

The Great German General Staff and all similar organisations shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.

The officers, or persons in the position of officers, in the Ministries of War in the different States in Germany and in the Administrations attached to them, must not exceed three hundred in number and are included in the maximum strength of four thousand laid down in the third sub-paragraph of paragraph (1) of this Article.

Article 164

Up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the League of Nations the German Army must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table No. II annexed to this Section, with the exception of an optional increase not exceeding one-twentyfifth part for small arms and one-fiftieth part for guns, which shall be exclusively used to provide for such eventual replacements as may be necessary.

Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the League of Nations the armaments fixed in the said Table shall remain in force until they are modified by the Council of the League. Furthermore she hereby agrees strictly to observe the decisions of the Council of the League on this subject.

Article 165

The maximum number of guns, machine guns, trench-mortars, rifles and the amount of ammunition and equipment which Germany is allowed to maintain during the period between the coming into force of the present Treaty and the date of March 31, 1920, referred to in Article 160, shall bear the same proportion to the amount authorized in Table No. III annexed to this Section as the strength of the German Army as reduced from time to time in accordance with Article 163 bears to the strength permitted under Article 160.

Public domain. The full treaty may be found at the First World War website: <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles.htm>.



Supporting Question 2

Featured Source

Source B: United States Holocaust Museum, map of German losses as a result of World War I, "German Territorial Losses, Treaty of Versailles, 1919," no date

GERMAN TERRITORIAL LOSSES, TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919



— US Holocaust Memorial Museum

Germany lost World War I. In the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the victorious powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, and other allied states) imposed punitive territorial, military, and economic provisions on defeated Germany. In the west, Germany returned Alsace-Lorraine to France. It had been seized by Germany more than 40 years earlier. Further, Belgium received Eupen and Malmedy; the industrial Saar region was placed under the administration of the League of Nations for 15 years; and Denmark received Northern Schleswig. Finally, the Rhineland was demilitarized; that is, no German military forces or fortifications were permitted there. In the east, Poland received parts of West Prussia and Silesia from Germany. In addition, Czechoslovakia received the Hultschin district from Germany; the largely German city of Danzig became a free city under the protection of the League of Nations; and Memel, a small strip of territory in East Prussia along the Baltic Sea, was ultimately placed under Lithuanian control. Outside Europe, Germany lost all its colonies. In sum, Germany forfeited 13 percent of its European territory (more than 27,000 square miles) and one-tenth of its population (between 6.5 and 7 million people).

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http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/media_nm.php?MediaId=1620.



Supporting Question 3

Featured Source

Source A: Facing History and Ourselves website, discussion of the 1919 peace treaty clause assigning Germany the blame for World War I, "Treaty of Versailles: The War Guilt Clause"

Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, known as the War Guilt Clause, was a statement that Germany was responsible for beginning World War I. It reads as follows:

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

The War Guilt Clause was added in order to get the French and Belgians to agree to reduce the sum of money that Germany would have to pay to compensate for war damage. The article was seen as a concession to the Germans by the negotiators. It was bitterly resented, however, by virtually all Germans who did not believe they were responsible for the outbreak of the war. This article was a constant thorn in the side of the Weimar leaders who tried to meet the terms of the agreement while trying to have these terms modified.

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Supporting Question 3

Featured Source

Source B: Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, leader of the German peace delegation, letter to Georges Clemenceau, president of the Paris Peace Conference, on the subject of peace terms (excerpts), May 1919

Mr. President:

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the observations of the German delegation on the draft treaty of peace.

We came to Versailles in the expectation of receiving a peace proposal based on the agreed principles. We were firmly resolved to do everything in our power with a view of fulfilling the grave obligations which we had undertaken. We hoped for the peace of justice which had been promised to us.

We were aghast when we read in documents the demands made upon us, the victorious violence of our enemies. The more deeply we penetrate into the spirit of this treaty, the more convinced we become of the impossibility of carrying it out. The exactions of this treaty are more than the German people can bear.

With a view to the re-establishment of the Polish State we must renounce indisputably German territory—nearly the whole of the Province of West Prussia, which is preponderantly German; of Pomerania; Danzig, which is German to the core; we must let that ancient Hanse town be transformed into a free State under Polish suzerainty.

We must agree that East Prussia shall be amputated from the body of the State, condemned to a lingering death, and robbed of its northern portion, including Memel, which is purely German.

We must renounce Upper Silesia for the benefit of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, although it has been in close political connection with Germany for more than 750 years, is instinct with German life, and forms the very foundation of industrial life throughout East Germany.

Preponderantly German circles (*Kreise*) must be ceded to Belgium, without sufficient guarantees that the plebiscite, which is only to take place afterward, will be independent. The purely German district of the Saar must be detached from our empire, and the way must be paved for its subsequent annexation to France, although we owe her debts in coal only, not in men.

For fifteen years Rhenish territory must be occupied, and after those fifteen years the Allies have power to refuse the restoration of the country; in the interval the Allies can take every measure to sever the economic and moral links with the mother country, and finally to misrepresent the wishes of the indigenous population.

Although the exaction of the cost of the war has been expressly renounced, yet Germany, thus cut in pieces and weakened, must declare herself ready in principle to bear all the war expenses of her enemies, which would exceed many times over the total amount of German State and private assets.

Meanwhile her enemies demand, in excess of the agreed conditions, reparation for damage suffered by their civil population, and in this connection Germany must also go bail for her allies. The sum to be paid is to be fixed by our

enemies unilaterally, and to admit of subsequent modification and increase. No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people for payment, determined not by their standard of life, but solely by their capacity to meet the demands of their enemies by their labour. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour.

In spite of the exorbitant demands, the reconstruction of our economic life is at the same time rendered impossible. We must surrender our merchant fleet. We are to renounce all foreign securities. We are to hand over to our enemies our property in all German enterprises abroad, even in the countries of our allies.

Even after the conclusion of peace the enemy States are to have the right of confiscating all German property. No German trader in their countries will be protected from these war measures. We must completely renounce our colonies, and not even German missionaries shall have the right to follow their calling therein.

We must thus renounce the realization of all our aims in the spheres of politics, economics, and ideas.

Even in internal affairs we are to give up the right to self-determination. The international Reparation Commission receives dictatorial powers over the whole life of our people in economic and cultural matters. Its authority extends far beyond that which the empire, the German Federal Council, and the Reichstag combined ever possessed within the territory of the empire.

This commission has unlimited control over the economic life of the State, of communities, and of individuals. Further, the entire educational and sanitary system depends on it. It can keep the whole German people in mental thrall. In order to increase the payments due, by the thrall, the commission can hamper measures for the social protection of the German worker.

In other spheres also Germany's sovereignty is abolished. Her chief waterways are subjected to international administration; she must construct in her territory such canals and such railways as her enemies wish; she must agree to treaties the contents of which are unknown to her, to be concluded by her enemies with the new States on the east, even when they concern her own functions. The German people are excluded from the League of Nations, to which is entrusted all work of common interest to the world.

Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence.

Germany knows that she must make sacrifices in order to attain peace. Germany knows that she has, by agreement, undertaken to make these sacrifices, and will go in this matter to the utmost limits of her capacity....

This treaty of peace is to be the greatest achievement of its kind in all history. There is no precedent for the conduct of such comprehensive negotiations by an exchange of written notes only.

The feeling of the peoples who have made such immense sacrifices makes them demand that their fate should be decided by an open, unreserved exchange of ideas on the principle: "Quite open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view."

Germany is to put her signature to the treaty laid before her and to carry it out. Even in her need, justice for her is too sacred a thing to allow her to stoop to achieve conditions which she cannot undertake to carry out.



Treaties of peace signed by the great powers have, it is true, in the history of the last decades, again and again proclaimed the right of the stronger. But each of these treaties of peace has been a factor in originating and prolonging the world war. Whenever in this war the victor has spoken to the vanquished, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, his words were but the seeds of future discord.

The lofty aims which our adversaries first set before themselves in their conduct of the war, the new era of an assured peace of justice, demand a treaty instinct with a different spirit.

Only the cooperation of all nations, a cooperation of hands and spirits, can build up a durable peace. We are under no delusions regarding the strength of the hatred and bitterness which this war has engendered, and yet the forces which are at work for a union of mankind are stronger now than ever they were before.

The historic task of the Peace Conference of Versailles is to bring about this union.

Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my distinguished consideration.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Public domain. Charles F. Horne, ed. *Source Records of the Great War*, Vol. VII. New York: National Alumni, 1923.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/parispeaceconf_germanprotest1.htm.



Supporting Question 4

Featured Source

Source A: Selected articles dealing with reparations from the treaty ending World War I, Treaty of Versailles (excerpts), June 28, 1919

Article 231

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Article 232

The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto.

In accordance with Germany's pledges, already given, as to complete restoration for Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to the compensation for damage elsewhere in this Part provided for, as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839, to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allied and Associated Governments up to November 11, 1918, together with interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum on such sums. This amount shall be determined by the Reparation Commission, and the German Government undertakes thereupon forthwith to make a special issue of bearer bonds to an equivalent amount payable in marks gold, on May 1, 1926, or, at the option of the German Government, on the 1st of May in any year up to 1926. Subject to the foregoing, the form of such bonds shall be determined by the Reparation Commission. Such bonds shall be handed over to the Reparation Commission, which has authority to take and acknowledge receipt thereof on behalf of Belgium.

Article 233

The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be called the Reparation Commission and constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in Annexes II to VII inclusive hereto.

This Commission shall consider the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard.

The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to the German Government on or before May 1, 1921, as representing the extent of that Government's obligations.

The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921. If, however, within the period mentioned, Germany fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may, within the



discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years, or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Part of the present Treaty, shall determine.

Article 236

Germany further agrees to the direct application of her economic resources to reparation as specified in Annexes, III, IV, V, and VI, relating respectively to merchant shipping, to physical restoration, to coal and derivatives of coal, and to dyestuffs and other chemical products; provided always that the value of the property transferred and any services rendered by her under these Annexes, assessed in the manner therein prescribed shall be credited to her towards liquidation of her obligations under the above Articles.

Public domain. The full treaty may be found at the First World War website: <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles231-247.htm>.



Supporting Question 4

Featured Source

Source B: John Maynard Keynes, analysis of the economic impact of the treaty that ended World War I, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (excerpts), 1919

The treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe—nothing to make the defeated Central empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new states of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New.

The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problem of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of politics, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the states whose destiny they were handling. ...

Europe consists of the densest aggregation of population in the history of the world. ... In relation to other continents Europe is not self-sufficient; in particular it cannot feed itself... This population secured for itself a livelihood before the war, without much margin of surplus, by means of a delicate and immensely complicated organization, of which the foundations were supported by coal, iron, transport, and an unbroken supply of imported food and raw materials from other continents. By the destruction of this organization and the interruption of the stream of supplies, a part of this population is deprived of its means of livelihood. Emigration is not open to the redundant surplus. ...

The danger confronting us, therefore, is the rapid depression of the standard of life of the European populations to a point which will mean actual starvation for some (a point already reached in Russia and approximately reached in Austria). Men will not always die quietly. For starvation, which brings to some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives other temperaments to the nervous instability of hysteria and to a mad despair. And these in their distress may overturn the remnants of organization, and submerge civilization itself in their attempts to satisfy desperately the overwhelming needs of the individual. ...

In a very short time, therefore, Germany will not be in a position to give bread and work to her numerous millions of inhabitants, who are prevented from earning their livelihood by navigation and trade... "We do not know, and indeed we doubt," the Report concludes, "whether the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers realize the inevitable consequences which will take place if Germany, an industrial state, very thickly populated, closely bound up with the economic system of the world, and under the necessity of importing enormous quantities of raw material and foodstuffs, suddenly finds herself pushed back to the phase of her development which corresponds to her economic condition and the numbers of her population as they were half a century ago. Those who sign this treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women, and children."



I know of no adequate answer to these words. The indictment is at least as true of the Austrian, as of the German, settlement. This is the fundamental problem in front of us, before which questions of territorial adjustment and the balance of European power are insignificant...

Public domain. Available at the PBS website:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/ess_keynesversailles.html.



Supporting Question 4

Featured Source

Source C: Margaret MacMillan, article analyzing the effects of World War I, “Ending the War to End All Wars” (excerpts), *New York Times*, December 25, 2010

Not many people noticed at the time, but World War I ended this year. Well, in a sense it did: on Oct. 3, Germany finally paid off the interest on bonds that had been taken out by the shaky Weimar government in an effort to pay the war reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.

While the amount, less than \$100 million, was trivial by today’s standards, the payment brought to a close one of the most poisonous chapters of the 20th century. It also, unfortunately, brought back to life an insidious historical myth: that the reparations and other treaty measures were so odious that they made Adolf Hitler’s rise and World War II inevitable.

In truth, the reparations, as the name suggests, were not intended as a punishment. They were meant to repair the damage done, mainly to Belgium and France, by the German invasion and subsequent four years of fighting. They would also help the Allies pay off huge loans they had taken to finance the war, mainly from the United States. At the Paris peace talks of 1919, President Woodrow Wilson was very clear that there should be no punitive fines on the losers, only legitimate costs. The other major statesmen in Paris, Prime Ministers David Lloyd George of Britain and Georges Clemenceau of France, reluctantly agreed, and Germany equally reluctantly signed the treaty.

In Weimar Germany, a society deeply divided by class and politics, hatred of the “dictated peace” was widespread, and there was no shame in trying to escape its provisions. The final sum for reparations was not mentioned in the treaty—itsself a humiliation in German eyes—but was eventually set in 1921 at 132 billion gold marks (about \$442 billion in today’s terms). The fact is that Germany could have managed to pay, but for political reasons chose not to.

The German government repeatedly challenged the amount, asked for moratoriums or simply stated that it could not pay. In 1924 and again in 1929, the total sum owed was negotiated down. In 1933, when the Nazis took power, Hitler simply canceled reparations unilaterally. In the end, it has been calculated, Germany paid less in real terms than France did after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to ‘71 (and France paid off those obligations in just a few years).

Yet this mattered little to the Germans, for whom it was all too easy to attribute every problem to reparations, and by extension to the Weimar government. Hitler did not attain power because of reparations—the Great Depression and the folly of the German ruling classes did that—but their existence gave him a political cudgel against Weimar. The wrangling over reparations also helped turn the German people against co-operation with the international system.

Equally important, the issue helped drive a wedge between France and Britain at a time when the liberal democracies needed to stand together. Many in the English-speaking world came to agree with the Germans that the Treaty of Versailles, and the reparations in particular, were unjust, and that Lloyd George had capitulated to the vengeful French. That sense of guilt played a role in the efforts by successive British governments to appease Hitler in the 1930s. ...

In a remarkably short time after 1918, many Germans also came to think that they had not really lost the war. Its armies during the war had inflicted stunning defeats on Germany’s foes, especially in the east, and little of German soil had been occupied by Allied troops either during the war or in defeat. The military elite mounted a successful



campaign in the 1920s to attribute the final German collapse to a “stab in the back” by enemies at home, particularly socialists, liberals and Jews.

This perception was absurd: Germany’s armies lost badly on the battlefields in the summer of 1918; its people were on the brink of starvation because of the British naval blockade; its Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian allies had crumbled; and its military had begged the government to make peace before it was too late. The armistice signed on Nov. 11 was clearly a surrender; Germany gave up its Navy and its submarines and its heavy field equipment, from tanks to artillery. But as things went from bad to worse such facts were easily distorted or ignored, especially in the late 1920s as Weimar faltered and Hitler rose.

This is not to say that the reparations were a good idea. They were economically unsound and a political mistake with serious consequences. John Maynard Keynes, a member of the British delegation in Paris, rightly argued that the Allies should have forgotten about reparations altogether. (It would have helped if America had written off the war loans it had made to Britain and France, but it was not prepared to do that.)

Still, one has to consider the political atmosphere in 1919. No French or Belgian politician could have openly agreed with Keynes; and even if Lloyd George had wanted to, he had to placate the hard-line Tories in his coalition government. The north of France and virtually the whole of Belgium had been occupied for four years by German soldiers who had driven off livestock, plundered factories and mines, and taken citizens to Germany for forced labor. The areas along the front lines, on the French-Belgian border, were wastelands. And we now have compelling evidence that German forces deliberately carried out a scorched-earth policy; they flooded mines, blew up bridges and stripped bare factories as they retreated.

As one French newspaper asked in 1919, why should the French taxpayer pay to fix the damage the invaders had done? The French remembered too, if nobody else did, that it was the Germans who had declared war on France in 1914, not the other way round. ...

More significantly, Germany was obliged to pay reparations after 1945, and in that case there was no negotiation at all: Germany was utterly defeated and the Allies simply helped themselves. The Soviet Union in particular extracted whatever it could and in the most brutal fashion. There was little outcry in Germany because of the total extent of the defeat and, equally important, it was impossible for Germans to argue that they were being unfairly blamed for the war.

It’s worth noting that less than a decade after the fall of the Nazis, the lingering legacy of the World War I reparations was settled quickly and with a minimum of fuss. A conference in London in 1953 produced the agreement whose terms were fulfilled in October. West Germany agreed to pay the interest on its interwar bonds and make compensation to claimants like those who were forced into labor—but only when it was reunited with East Germany. The agreement is often held up as a model to economically troubled countries for how to settle outstanding debts.

Perhaps Greece and Ireland and their debtors should be taking a look at it. And perhaps we should not be so quick to condemn the decisions of the past, but recognize that sometimes there are problems for which there are no easy solutions. In my view Germany could and should have made reparations for its aggression in World War I—but was the risk of renewed war worth forcing it to do so?

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